Travel and communication in the early medieval period were fundamental parts of people's conceptions about temporal and spiritual power, which in turn demonstrated a ruler's legit imacy. Examining the role of messengers and diplomatic envoys between the first Umayyad caliph of alAndalus, 'Abd alRahman III, and his fellow tenthcentury rulers in Christian kingdoms, including the Byzantine emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos and the first Holy Roman emperor, Otto I, illuminates internal and external negotiations that defined the pluralistic Iberian society in the early Middle Ages. Formal religious and ethnic differences among Muslim rulers and nonMuslim messengers enhanced the articulation of political le gitimacy by the caliph. Diplomatic correspondence with foreign rulers using the multiplicity of talents and ethnoreligious identities of their subjects was part of the social order provided by the Andalusi rulers and produced by those they ruled, demonstrating the political autho rity of the Umayyad caliphate.
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»The wise sages have said… the messenger is the place of a man's judgment, and his letter is the place of his intellect.« So related Ibn alFarra' in the Rasul al-muluk, a treatise on diplomacy commissioned by the caliph of alAndalus in the second half of the tenth century.
1 Political and diplomatic connections between elite groups and protostates happened at the personal and individual level in the early medieval period. At the same time, travel and communication were funda mental parts of people's conceptions about temporal and spiritual power. Messengers tra versed the Mediterranean bearing letters and gifts between the rulers of many regions, each with their own habits, cultures, and faiths. The messenger was a political or religious elite himself, carefully chosen to bear the words of his patron despite the hardships of travel and the potential dangers of transgressing foreign customs. The envoy was not merely a deliv ery service; his performance, oral and physical, was a substitute for facetoface interaction »The messenger is the place of a man's judgment«: Diplomacy between Emperors and Caliphs in the Tenth Century their external friends and enemies might be. In the diplomatic realm, religion's influence was not principally felt though its role in shaping individual identity, selfperception, or world view. 9 Andalusi Muslim rulers used nonMuslim messengers and courtiers to serve their own practical diplomatic ends with Christian states, with Andalusi Christian, Muslim, and Jewish individuals and collectives at times acting in a manner that appeared inconsistent with their religious ideals or identity.
To establish their legitimacy and authority, the Muslim rulers of alAndalus needed stan dards for their diplomatic proxies. From this milieu, a treatise on Andalusi diplomacy, the Rasul al-muluk, was written by Ibn alFarra'. 10 The Rasul al-muluk is part of the Muslim tra dition of adab, or advice, literature, also present throughout the Latin West as the specula principum, or »mirrors for princes«, genre. 11 In this case, Ibn alFarra's advice on diplomacy was intended for Andalusi Muslim rulers, but it also functioned as a kind of »mirror for messengers«, with some passages addressed to messengers and diplomats themselves. 12 The ostensible goal of the treatise was to establish diplomatic standards compatible with Qur'anic ethics.
The treatise, along with wellknown accounts of the Andalusi exchanges and embassies with nonMuslim states in the late tenth century, demonstrates the role of messengers in illuminating the political and religious relationships that shaped Andalusi society. This is best seen in practice by examining the crosscultural diplomatic interactions of the Umayyad caliph of Cordoba, 'Abd alRahman III (r. 912961).
13 'Abd alRahman consolidated power and adopted the title of caliph in 929 after he had taken over smaller kingdoms around Cor doba. The early tenthcentury decline of the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad and the rise of the Fatimid dynasty in Ifriqiya provided a catalyst for the declaration of an Umayyad caliphate in Spain. By 950, 'Abd alRahman's caliphal state with its capital at Cordoba was stable and prosperous, promoting intellectual and cultural ties from Baghdad and Tunis to Constanti nople and Metz. 'Abd alRahman maintained diplomatic relations with other Muslim elites, from Berber chieftains to Fatimid caliphs, using Muslim messengers. However, it is his em bassies with Christian rulers that are some of the most famous accounts of early medieval diplomacy, including relations with the Christian rulers immediately to the north in Iberia and Provence, as well as the Byzantine emperor Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos (r. 945 959), and the first Holy Roman emperor, Otto I (r. 936973). Examining these episodes and the messengers involved in light of the Rasul al-muluk will demonstrate the way that formal religious and ethnic differences among rulers and messengers enhanced the articulation of political legitimacy by the caliph.
The selection of appropriate messengers and diplomats was seen as a demonstration of Andalusi rulers' judgement and wisdom, justifying their claims to political authority in the Iberian Peninsula. Umayyad authority in the region was grounded in Arab patriarchal dy nastic claims, even though they were descended matrilineally from nonArabs.
14 However, just as important as these dynastic claims was the justification of their rule through their success in governing the Iberian peninsula. 15 This »performance legitimacy« -the ability to get things done -is part of relational political authority, defined as a social contract between a ruler, who provides a social order that is valuable to those they rule, and the ruled, who comply with the ruler's commands necessary to the production of that order. 16 The idea that successful rule depended on the satisfaction of one's subjects was a truism in tenthcentury alAndalus; good policy included »winning the hearts of the common people by being fair to them.« 17 Diplomatic exchanges with foreign rulers using the multiplicity of talents and ethno religious identities of their subjects was part of the social order provided by the An dalusi rulers and produced by those they ruled, which legitimized the political authority of the new Umayyad caliphate in the Iberian Peninsula.
The Problem of Piracy in the Western Mediterranean
Crosscultural connections between alAndalus and the neighboring kingdoms in the west ern Mediterranean occurred across physical borders, but also across the imagined bor ders of religion and ethnicity. Jewish identity in service of the Muslim Andalusi rulers, producing social order for himself and his confessional community, while at the same time legitimating the political authority of the Umayyad caliphate. In the pluralistic Andalusi society, Jewish messengers made con venient gobetweens for Muslim and Christian rulers, as they were excluded from religious cohesion with the majority group, but served the political needs of the caliphate, who in turn provided legal protection.
Hasdai ibn Shaprut first appears in the sources as part of the embassies between the ca liph of Cordoba and his neighbors regarding piracy on the Mediterranean. Peace treaties bet ween 'Abd alRahman III and Christian rulers of northern Iberia and southern Francia in the 940s indicated that some pirates were Andalusi. While the pirates along the Provençal and Catalan coasts were not under the direct control of the government in Cordoba, they were in contact with the caliph's messengers and were likely indirectly supported by the Andalusi navy based in Almería and the Balearic Islands. 20 The messengers represented the legitimate power of the caliphate. At the same time, the reason for the diplomatic mission was the ac tions of nonstate actors loosely connected with the Andalusi government.
In the ninth century, groups of Andalusi Muslim pirates, including some based at Fraxine tum in the hills above modern StTropez, harassed Christian ships based in southern France and northern Italy. 21 Additionally, Iberians in both Muslim and Christian territories increased their fortifications and naval fleets due to Viking incursions in the Mediterranean. The evi dence from the surviving textual sources and material culture is problematic in both dating and context, as the new walls, towers, and docks that dotted the coastal landscape seem to have come from a period without textually documented Viking raiding in the late ninth century. 22 These improved defenses might have been responsible for the limited attacks in the period, but there is no evidence that the fortifications were used to defend against Scan dinavians, rather than pirates from the Balearics or the Maghreb, whom the written sources also mention. The increase in the Andalusi navy and their coastal fortifications, whether to protect against Viking or Maghrebi pirates, began in the ninth century, which allowed al Andalus's maritime dominance in the western Mediterranean to continue through the tenth century.
The embassies between 'Abd alRahman and rulers in the western Mediterranean were not focused on common defense of Iberia and other Mediterranean ports from Scandinavian pirates, but rather on the actions of Andalusi Muslim pirates. It is unlikely that these non state actors were even under the nominal control of alAndalus given the lack of political hege mony by any state in the premodern western Mediterranean. However, pirates oper ating in the territories of noncentralized medieval governments, such as Francia, often en gaged in timeintensive kidnappings for ransom. In contrast, those operating around more centralized states, such as alAndalus, often seized ships and cargo and sold them for profit because there were markets necessary for operations there. 23 Having made his threats with the Andalusi navy at his back, Ibn Shaprut returned to Cordoba. He brought with him Gotmar, Sunyer of Barcelona's envoy, to finalize the treaty. In return for Sunyer's capitulation, the caliph ordered the navy to practice »abstinence from [Sunyer's] provinces and peaceful behavior towards the people of his land« for two years.
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Such peace applied only to Barcelona, and only for two years. It did not prevent the Andalusi navy (or Muslim pirates) from continuing to raid in the area. 'Abd alRahman's created a treaty that worked against the interests of his coreligionist pirates, who had demonstrated a threat to wider trade relations with nearby regions. However, his confessional differences with his Christian neighbors made the negotiations delicate. Utilizing the talents and the outsider/insider status of his Jewish envoy, 'Abd alRahman and Hasdai ibn Shaprut together produced social order in the peninsula, which in turn legitimized the political authority of the Umayyad caliphate both within and outside its territory.
At least one Christian ruler in the western Mediterranean imitated the policy of the ca liphs of Cordoba of legitimating their rule by using the formal religious and ethnic differ ences among rulers and messengers. Viscountess Richildis of Narbonne negotiated her own peace and trade agreement with 'Abd alRahman. 34 She sent gifts and her Jewish advisor, a man named Bernat, to the court at Cordoba. Narbonne, as part of the territory of Septimania, had been part of alAndalus for forty years, between 719 and 759, and there was a vibrant Jewish community there. 35 Culturally connected to alAndalus, though now with Christian elite political governance, Richildis utilized her Jewish subjects as messengers in diplomatic negotiations. 'Abd alRahman »entertained [Richildis'] messenger bountifully« though Ibn Hayyan does not state their exact agreement. Richildis and 'Abd alRahman, despite their own confessional differences, spoke the same language of diplomacy and used the religious and ethnic differences among the populations inside their territories, both with significant minority populations, each to their own advantage. Beyond the problem of piracy, the other reason given for the diplomatic convoy to the south was that 'Abd alRahman had sent his own ambassador to Otto's court previously, with a letter that contained various blasphemies against Christ.
38 That messenger had died at Otto's court, and Otto, wanting to continue the conversation, and also respond in kind with an offensive letter, sent his own messenger. Otto sent John of Gorze with gifts and a letter with words in it that were offensive to Islam. None of these letters survive; the general content is known through narrative sources. Benjamin Kedar has argued that these letters represent a minor misunderstanding of theological doctrine, the first letter perhaps con taining some reference to Islamic tenets that medieval western Christians might find offen sive. 39 Kedar bases his assumption that the letter was not in fact blasphemous on the fact that the caliph's initial letter was brought by a Mozarabic Christian bishop who died of unknown causes while at Otto's court. However, given their minority status in the caliphate, Mozarabic Christians would have had a different cultural standard for statements »offensive« to Chris t i anity than those the Ottonian court would have had. A Christian bishop employed as an ambassador by the caliph would be used to exclusionary, and to an outsider's ear, offensive, statements of religious difference. The initial letter, which touched off two more subsequent embassies, need not have been either blasphemous or misunderstood, but was likely both. The messenger's role in causing misunderstanding, and indeed willful offense, to the re cipients of his master's letter is addressed by Rasul al-muluk. Ibn alFarra' discussed the situ ation of a messenger »carrying a harsh message to another ruler, ordered to deliver it exactly as they were told« to highlight how the messenger's desired qualities of loyalty and diplo matic talent are displayed. 40 The messenger had been tasked with sending an offensive and harsh message to a neighboring king, angering the foreign king and causing him to take out his anger on the bearer of the message by threatening punishment. The messenger replied that he would convey even offensive messages back to his patron, which the king questioned, saying that the messenger would be afraid to report back anything negative. The messenger responded, »It would be strange that I should come to you with his message and be safe from your anger, although I am hostile to you, and then should take your words to him and not trust his patience, although I am with him …« 41 This logic and loyalty diffused the king's anger, and the moral of the tale is the truly ancient chestnut that »the messenger is merely the bearer [of a message] and should not be blamed.« Part of the utility of messengers who shared the faith of the letters' recipients but not that of their own masters, as was the case for Mozarabic Christian messengers who served the caliph, was the possibility of diffusing volatile situations by the messenger and recipient sharing the ecumenical tie of a common religious faith, but not a political one in that they served different rulers. The death of the caliph's ambassador while in East Francia, as well as a need to continue the conversation about the Muslim pirates off the Provençal coast, and a desire to reduce the caliph's impiety led Otto I to send his own ambassador, John of Gorze, to Cordoba. John was an ascetic monk of comparatively humble beginnings who traveled in Italy and Lotharingia to reform monasteries to his religious standards at the request of various local authorities. He and other Gorze monks had journeyed to Rome at the request of Pope Agapetus II in order to »restore discipline« to the monastery of St. Paul in 950. The Gorze Reform movement has been discussed in concert with Cluniac and broader Benedictine reform movements of the tenth and eleventh centuries. 42 While the monks at Gorze observed the Benedictine rule and the strict enclosure of stabilitas loci, John of Gorze traveled on behalf of the monastery for a variety of reasons, practical, political, and scholarly.
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Unlike Septimania or alAndalus, the Ottonian rulers in eastern Francia did not have a significant population that was not part of the majority religion to involve in diplomatic relations, nor did they wish to. John of Gorze was coopted by Otto I for diplomacy through his bishop, Adalbero of Metz, who was a patron to Gorze. John was known as a holy man; his power came from his exemplary life and behavior, not from his lineage. In the tenth century »era of reform«, the mutually beneficial relationship of holy men and powerful patrons made John not just a mascot for monastic reform and the holy Christian life, but a tool that Otto sought to use in his relationship with Caliph 'Abd alRahman III. His strictness in his Christ ian behavior was seen as an asset for the embassy, as he was a Christian of a different stripe from both his less severe local brethren and from Mozarabic clerics. This is the very opposite tack to that taken by 'Abd alRahman, and advised by the Rasul al-muluk, who utilized his nonMuslim subjects to smooth diplomatic waters. In contrast, Otto sent his most rigorous cleric, one guaranteed to take a hard line in negotiations.
Additionally, Otto likely sent John of Gorze because he was an experienced longdistance traveler. Religious travel, like pilgrimage or monastic reform, and secular travel, such as that of merchants and diplomats, happened along the same routes, or even in the same people. A merchant could also be a pilgrim; an abbot could also be a diplomat. They all moved along the old Roman roads, on rivers, on the Mediterranean itself, often traveling in boats owned by others, sailed by professionals, buying and selling horses and donkeys, staying in tents, hospitales, and monasteries. The author described John's route, from which the Roman road that John and his entourage traveled on between Metz and Lyon can be inferred. 44 Having reached Lyon, the party embarked upon a ship down the Rhône and onwards to Barcelona. Upon their arrival in Barcelona, local messengers alerted the caliph that the ambassadors had arrived, and from there men were sent to guide the travelers south, through Tortosa and onwards to the court in Cordoba. Once in Cordoba, the Franks were given accommodations in a villa »fit for a king« only two miles distant from the palace in order to impress these potential allies with the wealth, luxury, and sophistication of the Umayyad court.
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On Otto I's orders, John of Gorze arrived in the heart of Muslim Iberia in 953. The vita of John provides a detailed discussion of the embassy, in which the caliph used his nonMuslim subjects in diplomatic negotiations, including Hasdai ibn Shaprut, the caliph's Jewish wazir, and Johannes, a local Mozarabic Christian cleric. The Andalusis were all allies living together, facing the outside force that John represented: the Germanic king Otto I. Despite dogmatic similarities with the envoys for the Christians, these Andalusi individuals were acting col lectively based upon these particular circumstances, and not according to an ideal of either unity or chauvinism, but because of the needs of the caliphate and kingdom. These needs included the practical issues of Mediterranean pirates, as well as the notsominor skirmish that had erupted over the precise wording of the religious ideas in the diplomatic missives themselves.
The caliph did not meet with John immediately -he sent a trusted advisor to debrief the ambassadors, trying to determine their motivations for the diplomatic mission. The coun selor that 'Abd alRahman sent first was none other than the experienced ambassador Hasdai ibn Shaprut, whom John of Gorze called »a man of great wisdom and knowledge.« Knowing the local customs of both Iberia and Muslims were foreign to John and his entourage, the first thing Ibn Shaprut said to John of Gorze was about how he and his fellow travelers ought to behave in Cordoba. These young men should restrain themselves from any possible idle speech or rude gestures; nothing would be so slight that it would not at once be reported to the caliph. If the opportunity for going out was extended to them, they should not practice any offensive humor with the women as there would be a very harsh punishment for them. They should by no means overstep the stipulated boundary, for they would be carefully watched, and if caught, strung up for almost nothing.
46
The Jewish counselor's admonishments to a Christian clericambassador and his entourage reveal both the cultural divide regarding proper behavior (particularly with women) but also the not so subtle reminder that deviations from proper behavior carried with them severe punishments, even for foreigners. After the lecture on customs, Ibn Shaprut got down to business by asking John of Gorze his purpose in Cordoba and what messages the letter from the emperor contained. John was not shy about the letter's potential for offense. While he was a hardline Christian, John of Gorze was still a skillful negotiator for Otto I as he relayed the letter's disrespectful tone without yet delivering the letter.
After determining that the emperor's letter could not be presented to the caliph, Ibn Shaprut retreated, and a few months later the second of the caliph's nonMuslim subjects ar rived to dissuade John from presenting the offensive letter. This time, it was a fellow Christ ian, a Mozarabic bishop named John. Bishop John made this case to John of Gorze:
Think »under what conditions we live. Through our sins [we are subject to] the author ity [of Muslims]. We are forbidden from resisting this power by the word of the Apostle. The only comfort is that, in such a calamity, we are not forbidden from making use of our own laws. If they see diligent observers of Christianity, they protect and embrace them, just as they are pleased by their own association, while they despise the Jews completely. At this time we advise that, because no harm is being done to religion, we yield to them in other areas and we obey their commands to the extent that they do not hinder our faith. Therefore, it would be much better for you to keep silent about these things now, and to suppress the letter altogether, rather than stir up a very disastrous scandal for you and for your people when it's not necessary to pursue it.« 47 With its bias against Jews and Muslims, this Ottonian rhetoric against nonChristians was designed to demonstrate local religious superiority, rather than describe the real conditions of alAndalus. It is difficult to understand Andalusi diplomatic policy from this source, as it was written by Ottonians (not Andalusis) in a religious genre of literature (hagiography) that was not normally used to bridge the gap between peoples of differing faiths. However, by looking beyond the inflammatory rhetoric and religious chauvinism, the quotation from Bishop John, a Mozarabic bishop, was great advice for how to get along with the Muslim elites. As leaders of a minority religious group, local bishops would have often sought to prevent clashes, especially when the alternative (that is, silence) would harm no one. 48 As an outsider to alAndalus and a rigorous monastic reformer, John of Gorze was incensed by this advice, calling Bishop John a coward and then insinuating that the local Christians were not true to the faith because they were circumcised and practiced the same dietary laws as the Muslims by abstaining from pork and other foods. The key difference though between these reactions lies in the power differentials between the parties. John of Gorze was a foreigner and a representative of a powerful ruler in the north. Silence in John's case would have placed him and Otto I in a weaker position. In contrast, the local bishop was a subject of the caliph, and his proposal for silence reveals his subordinate role in the local hierarchy. Mozarabic Christians had a role to play in diplomacy with fellow Christians outside of their political community, such as with the Ottonian envoys. In general, Andalusi ethnoreligious groups had a vested interest in working with people with similar political goals, but outside of their respective faiths for practical economic, political, or social purposes. At this point in the diplomatic exchange, instead of John of Gorze backing down by giv ing the gifts but not the letter (against the emperor's standing orders), or ruining the whole mission, John and the caliph's intermediaries determined another path, which involved more travel. John of Gorze stayed put as a »guest«, or perhaps hostage, of the caliph, and in 955 'Abd alRahman III sent a Mozarabic Christian messenger, Recemund, north to Emperor Otto I. Recemund carried a letter from John explaining the situation to Otto, requesting a new letter from his patron that did not contain the offensive passages. Recemund made careful inquiries with John about the customs of the Ottonian court, and traveled north in ten weeks, arriving at Metz in August 955. 49 He stayed at Metz and Gorze with John's bishop (and Ottonian courtier Adalbero) through the fall and winter, receiving his audience with Otto himself in the spring and returning with a new letter (this one without the offensive passages), as well as a new Ottonian messenger, a cleric from Verdun named Dudo. Recemund made significant connections among the elite Christians he met at Otto's court, most notably with another diplomat, Luidprand of Cremona, Otto's ambassador to Cons tantinople on multiple occasions. Liudprand dedicated Antapodosis to Recemund, which he started writing two years after the latter's departure, around 958. Liudprand spent the first four chapters of that work on the dedication to his friend and a discussion of the Muslim pi rates at Fraxinetum, which had been the ostensible subject of the whole em bassy. According to Liudprand, the connection between the pirates along the Provençal coast and the An dalusis in Iberia was clear, as the Muslim pirates »secretly began to inspect the neighboring populations all around; they sent many messengers to Spain who extolled the place and pro mised that they considered the neighboring populations to be nothing.« 50 The neighboring populations were likely Christian, and Luidprand assumes they were when he laments the slaughter of Christians in the same chapter. However, this was not necessarily the case, and those Andalusis to whom the pirates sent messengers need not have been Muslim either to 
Andalusi and Byzantine Relations
The distance between the territories of the Byzantine Empire in the eastern Mediterranean and the Umayyad caliphate in the western Mediterranean was substantial, but both powers sought diplomatic relationships with one another to demonstrate their power and articulate the legitimacy of their rule in their respective spheres of influence. Compared to the Ottonian court, the Byzantine rulers were more familiar with dealing with nonChristians. In general, the Byzantine emperors were on good terms with the Umayyad caliphs of Cordoba during the tenth century, as the latter had stayed out of the naval conflicts between the Byzantines and the Fatimids in the eastern Mediterranean. The Umayyads even took the Byzantine side in some of the skirmishes over Sicily in the 960s. 51 Given the cordial, though not warm, re lations between the two powers at either end of the Mediterranean, the Rasul al-muluk was careful to suggest that in correspondence with the emperors of Byzantium, there was no need for unnecessary offense in the use of titles. Ibn alFarra' gave historical examples, first when the tenth Umayyad caliph of Damascus (r. 724743) corresponded with the Byzantine emperor, addressing the letter, »From Hisham b. 'Abd alMalik, Commander of the Faithful, to the tyrant, the Byzantine emperor«, causing the emperor to toss out the letter without reading it and »dismember the countries of Islam.« 52 Ibn alFarra' clearly saw a connection between poor diplomatic manners and military losses. The Byzantines likewise had a policy of using the appropriate titles in diplomatic correspondence when engaged with Muslim counterparts, and the Rasul al-muluk says that the Byzantine emperor Basil I wrote the Ab basid caliph AlMu'tasim utilizing his proper title of Commander of the Faithful and calling him brother. 53 The use of superlative titles for the caliphs by the emperors was intended to convey respect and acknowledge their authority, as there are many examples throughout the tenth century of such behaviors in diplomatic letters. 54 Byzantine sources corroborate this, AlMaqqari gave the most expansive account of Byzantine embassy, quoting the lost Ibn Hayyan material at length. He described the decoration of the caliphal palace saying that the »ambassadors were struck with astonishment at the splendor and magnificence displayed before them.« 60 Accompanied by a military escort provided by the caliph, the Byzantine party paraded in strict order of precedence from their residence to the throne room of his palace. The Byzantine envoys were housed at the munya, or villa, of Nasr, which was located on the left bank of the Guadalquivir River within sight of the walled city center of Cordoba itself.
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At the palace, 'Abd alRahman received them, flanked by his son and heir, alHakam, his other sons, as well as his courtiers, also lined up according to their importance. Andalusi his torian, Ibn 'Idhari (fl. 1312) made sure to mention that the ambassadors were bowled over by the magnificence of the caliphal palace. 62 He also indicated that the Byzantine ambassadors were prepared to prostrate themselves before the caliph, but 'Abd alRahman gave a signal that they did not need to do so, and the imperial messengers delivered their letter.
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According to alMaqqari, Ibn Hayyan reported that Constantine VII sent his imperial messengers to Cordoba bearing gifts and a ceremonial letter to Cordoba with gold lettering (chrysography) on azure paper requesting an alliance with the caliph. 64 He described the missives, saying:
within the letter was an enclosure, the ground of which was also skyblue, like the firstmentioned, but the characters were of silver; it was likewise written in Greek, and contained a list and description of the presents which the Lord of Constantinople sent to the Caliph. Upon the letter was a seal of gold. Of the weight of four mithkals, on one side of which was a likeness of the Messiah, and, on the other, those of the King Constantine and his son. The letter was enclosed in a bag of silver cloth, over which was a case of gold with a portrait of King Constantine admirably executed on stained glass. All this was enclosed in a case covered with a cloth of silk and gold tissue. On the first line of the 'Inwan or introduction was written, ›Constantine and Romanus, believers in the Messiah, Kings of the Greeks', and in the next, ›To the great and exalted in dignity and power, as he most deserves, the noble on descent, 'Abd alRahman the Caliph, who rules over Despite the regular use of nonMuslim messengers and the reception of both Latin and Greek Christian envoys at court, the religious divisions between the parties were still made clear during these missions. The audience of both the embassy itself and the historical nar rative that related it needed reminding of the importance of being not only a subject of the caliph, but also Muslim. Several of the Andalusi histories related how Abd alRahman III instructed that a courtier give a welcome speech to the Byzantine envoys that proclaimed the superiority of Islam, the power of the caliphate, the mercy of God, and the humiliation of the enemies of Islam to foreign guests and courtiers alike. 69 Many scholarcourtiers fail ed to perform adequately, including a famous scholar from Baghdad, but a Berber schol ar and judge named Mundhir ibn Sa'id alBalluti performed a khutba, or sermon (largely lost), which included: »O Assembly of Muslims! You know here on this peninsula you are surround ed by all kinds of polytheists and all types of heretics who seek to sow dissen tion among and break your community apart.« 70 Arabic public sermons and panegyrics to rulers played an important role in the promotion of the caliphate's image. Fundamental to establish ing this political legitimacy was the virtue of safeguarding Andalusi territory for the proper observance of Islam against outsiders, and these panegyrics often ended with hopes for the ruler's long life, as it would be through him that the best of all political circumstances were sustained. 71 The sermon by alBalluti was meant to demonstrate that the Andalusis were superior to foreigners, even fellow Muslims from the Abbasid caliphate, in oratory, know ledge, and performance. It was also meant to indicate that the Umayyad caliphate was equal to the Byzantine Empire. While the use of nonMuslim messengers was one way to smooth the diplomatic waters and enhance the articulation of political legitimacy by Abd alRahman III, other methods, including outright statements of superiority over rivals, both Muslim and nonMuslim, were other tools in the Andalusi caliph's arsenal.
Exchanging Messengers, Exchanging Ideas
In concert with their political roles, the messengers of alAndalus often served as a conduit through which ideas were transmitted both among themselves and between the scholars of Europe and the Mediterranean. During the initial trip of the Byzantine emperor's men to Cordoba, with the skyblue letter discussed previously, the Byzantines brought gifts. between Christian, Jewish, and Muslim physicians, all working towards the common goal of understanding the obscure pharmacological references of Dioscorides, illustrate the way that individuals of different faiths and political affiliations worked together intimately because of these diplomatic relationships. While in the past this might have been termed convivencia, interactions between different ethnoreligious groups were at times positive, negative, and neutral depending on the larger political and religious contexts. Likewise, John of Gorze's travel to Cordoba and Recemund's travel to East Francia in volved the exchange of knowledge, but it also demonstrates the limits of these kinds of cultural in teractions. Despite the survival of the eleventhcentury library catalog from Gorze Abbey, there do not appear to be any works contained there that scholars can say came definitively from Spain, despite the presumed access of John and his party to books and/or people with scientific knowledge not available in the Frankish world in the tenth century. This is in con trast to books surviving in the catalog from John's trip to Monte Cassino, such as Aristotle's Categories and Boethius' translation of the introduction to Porphyry's Isa goge. 76 80 John of Gorze's erudition included Easter computus and practical astronomy, important scientific fields in the early Middle Ages. 81 However, there is no sur viving evidence that either John and Recemund brought any astronomical or scientific texts from Cordoba to Gorze, or vice versa. Diplomatic efforts and correspondence with foreign rulers using the multiplicity of ta lents and ethnoreligious identities of their subjects were part of the social order provided by the Andalusi rulers and produced by those they ruled. If »the messenger is the place of a man's judgment, and his letter is the place of his intellect,« then in the view of Caliph 'Abd alRahman III, the messengers that he sent to Christian rulers and emperors in the midtenth century demonstrated his political and religious authority over the ethnoreligious commu nities he ruled in alAndalus. His wisdom in sending men who shared confessional or ethnic ties with his rivals, but owed their political loyalty to him as al-kalifah al-nasir li-Din Allah (the caliph, the defender of the religion of God) showed his temporal and spiritual power, which in turn demonstrated his legitimacy.
